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In this paper, we identify and describe the particular characteristics of moral choice in politi-
cal ethics. For that purpose, the main features of political ethics as applied ethics, as well as 
its difference from other areas of applied ethics, are revealed. We describe the method and 
the limits of interpretation of political ethics as professional ethics. We come to the conclu-
sion that in some cases of political choice we cannot appeal to norms and principles of public 
morality. The reasons are the ineradicable properties and goals of political activity—that is, 
its significant impact on the welfare and lives of citizens of the state, a high degree of risk 
and uncertainty, and the continuous presence of open ethical questions. On that ground, we 
argue that in the case of moral choice political ethics should analyze each situation separately, 
since any attempt to create universal prescriptions and recommendations would inevitably fail 
as inappropriate. Hereafter, we propose the typology of ethical conflicts typical for political 
practice. The first type is the moral conflict caused by the necessity of political compromise 
that presupposes breaking previous promises. The second type is proper moral dilemmas that 
include the choice between life and death of other people. The third type presents the choice 
between some historically significant goals and the personal political career of a politician. 
In the discussion, we will provide real-life examples for each type of political moral conflict. 
The main research methods of the paper are categorical analysis of ethical concepts, compara-
tive analysis, cultural-historical method, analysis of moral dilemmas, event analysis, political-
psychological method, method of political-cultural comparative studies, and content analysis.
Keywords: political ethics, moral conflict, moral choice in politics, compromise, lies in politics, 
moral motivation of politicians, the responsibility of politicians, political suicide.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of ethical choice of politician both as a per-
son and as an actor of social relationships. First, we will address the subject of relation 
between politics and morality. On this ground, we specify the concept of political ethics 
as well as the particular characteristics of ethical decision in politics. In the second part 
of the paper we propose the typology of ethical conflicts typical for the political practice.
At the beginning of our discussion on political ethics, we would like to conceptualize 
it as a form of applied ethics. 
The generalized definition of applied ethics could run as follows: “Applied ethics is 
the theory and practice of applying ethical norms and values to the variety of problematic 
situations both in public, professional and private life.” The applied ethics is embodied in 
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several disciplines distinct from one another such as bioethics, business ethics, environ-
mental ethics, legal ethics, etc. Therefore, political ethics could be regarded as an example 
of the applied ethics as well.
Unfortunately, the subject matter and the correlation between the theoretical and 
practical components of each above mentioned type of applied ethics still constitute a 
conceptual problem. In case of theoretical study of political ethics, it is the characteristics 
of political life that need to be taken into consideration.
Being a part of human life, politics has a series of typical characteristics that we could 
observe anytime and anywhere in the world. At the same time, politics frequently gives 
rise to unique problems and cases, which do not fall within the scope of standard social 
norms and values, including moral norms and values. Thus, in order to clarify the concept 
of political ethics we need to consider the special status of political action and political 
choice.
This is a common point of view, both among people who engage in political activity 
and those who have almost no interest in politics, that politics is a kind of dirty business, 
and even a genuine service for the sake of people and their welfare inevitably goes hand in 
hand with violation of some moral norms.
Here the important comment is to be made that such activities as corruption as well 
as abuse of political power, or intentional deception, betrayal, etc., carried out to one’s per-
sonal advantage or for promoting interests of a political party, are not the subject of this 
paper. That kind of deeds gives us almost no resources for the ethical analysis and pertains 
to the field of legal science, physiology or political science.
We regard politician as a public person, who acts not only upon self-interest but also 
in terms of political rationality and the common good (bonum commune).
It is much more important for the political ethics to explain the dissonance between 
political choice, political action and the violation of moral norms, which the political 
choice may occasionally require.
The established point of view of the majority of contemporary researchers that we 
endorse here is that we need to make a clear distinction between the normative ethics 
(especially the ethics of universal rules and values) and the political ethics as a part of ap-
plied ethics.
It was Cicero who drew the important distinction between justice and political expe-
diency: “we, truly the most just of human beings, not permit the Transalpine nations to 
grow olive and vine, so that our olive groves and vineyards will be worth more! When we 
do this, we are said to do so prudently; but we are not said to do so justly” (De re publica, 
III: IX,16: Fott (2014) [1].
As the German political philosopher Bernhard Sutor states, politics always has a mor-
al side and is to comply with the moral values, but at the same time we cannot discuss and 
evaluate politics on the basis of moral considerations only [2, p. 31].
In his influential article “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands” Michael 
Walzer promoted the term “the dirty hands” and discussed the crucial dilemma in politics 
that is the alleged possibility to perform unjust acts for the sake of the common good. 
Walzer claimed that politician could be regarded to be honest if she or he inflicts harm 
voluntarily and consciously but at the same time is sensible of all possible consequences 
and even feels guilty. Walzer called for the close attention to the internal side of “moral” 
choice that a politician makes [3].
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Bernard Williams in his essay “Politics and moral character” also makes a clear dis-
tinction between the ordinary morals and political ethics [4, p. 69–70].
The similar opinion was expressed by Russian scholar Boris Kapustin who warns us 
against a simple incorporation of morals into politics. For Kapustin, the nature of politics 
is the conflict that is always related to some form of violence. It is not uncommon that the 
violence in politics affects the life and death of citizens, so we cannot build the political 
relationships in accordance with the golden rule because that would paradoxically lead 
not only to political defeat but also to betraying your followers and doing favor to evil 
[5, p. 4].
Thus, morality and political ethics are not the same. Political action cannot be dis-
cussed in terms of common moral consciousness or public morality. One shouldn’t just 
claim that all politicians have their hands dirty. Political ethics should take into account 
the specifics of the political life that is the continuous presence of conflicts and the neces-
sity for politicians to make tough choices.
The political ethics is a part of applied ethics that analyzes the specifics of the mani-
festation of morality in political life and determines the limits of what is permissible in 
political activity.
Quite often the applied ethics is interpreted as a part or a subdivision of the profes-
sional ethics. To some extent, it is true because the applied ethics came into being in vari-
ous professional areas and was aimed at solving the moral problems of some particular 
professional practice.
Each period of the history as well as each society form the conditions to define the 
essence, the value, the goals and objectives for a particular professional practice. Those 
conditions serve as the basis of the system of norms and values for the professional com-
munity and the formal and informal framework for the professional choices. In other 
words, it is the society that determines the way a politician should act. The goals signifi-
cant for a given society form the criteria for the principles and norms of each profession.
This set of the principles and norms could make a firm and unambiguous moral 
foundation for the professions related to politics. However, we need to take into account 
those aspects of the activities of politicians that require a specific approach to the practical 
guidelines and rules of ethical decision making for the areas of professional activity we are 
considering. It is the crucial distinction that produces a lot of problems, namely the dis-
tinction between the values associated with the interests of society, the principles that are 
set in regulatory documents, the norms that are manifest themselves in human behavior 
and, finally, real practice. This discrepancy makes it difficult to study the political ethics as 
an institutionalized professional ethics.
Another important aspect is the existence of so-called open problems, for example, 
the justification the practice of civil disobedience, the double effect problem, the discus-
sion on invasion of privacy etc. The controversies like those cause uncertainty in moral 
evaluation. The debatable, unresolved problems are the real challenge for a politician who 
tries to follow some professional ethical principles but is forced to act in a real time limit 
with the burden of ethical choice and responsibility imposed solely on her or him.
Now, it is crucial to take into consideration that politic action is a professional activity 
that deals directly with people’s life and destiny. Therefore, it is connected with the burden 
of deciding on the rights, property and future life of people, that is of making decisions 
that are irreparable.
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Perhaps when politicians are accused of immorality, most commonly they are ac-
cused of lying. Even whose people who allow lying in their private life deem it impermis-
sible for politicians to lie whatsoever, or to lie for their electorate at least.
Here, we should draw a distinction between two purposes of lying. The one is the 
intended lie for acquiring a personal advantage or some preferences for their own party or 
benefactors. Another form is the deliberate deceit under the necessity of choice between 
the bigger and lesser deception or between the lying and the honesty that could bring 
about even more harm. The second type of lie relates to the scope of political ethics.
It is clear that it is hard to establish a clear boundary between the motives why poli-
ticians lie. However, it seems that we could try to distinguish between the “black” and 
“white” lies in politics, which will allow to discuss the issue of the “white” lie not only for 
blaming it.
After the elections to the German Bundestag in September 2017, Angela Merkel 
proceeded to form a government but she was faced with two serious troubles. The first 
problem was the worst result of the CDU/CSU coalition, that she is leader of, compared 
to previous elections. The second problem was the remarkable increase in the popularity 
of competing political parties. In order to form a government, Merkel needed to make 
serious concessions and enter into an alliance with her former opponents. But this meant 
giving up part of her election promises. The ideological differences did not allow making 
an alliance with the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) previously. But Merkel 
was forced to give that party several ministerial posts. What made the matter worse was 
that she surrendered to blackmail by The Greens and agreed to start implementing their 
project to ban completely the use of vehicles with an internal combustion engine from 
2030.
According to experts, fulfilling this demand of environmental protection will lead to 
a serious transformation of the automobile industry in Germany. This would entail job 
cuts for those to whom Merkel had promised economic development after her victory.
Despite these difficulties, Merkel chose to form the government and provoked a bar-
rage of criticism. The head of the SPD Martin Schulz was subjected to similar criticism in 
treachery and collusion with an ideological opponent.
In the eyes of their voters, the agreement of Merkel and Schulz to form a government 
seemed to be a violation of their promises and the proof of their mendacity. But that was 
not the case for the political reality. Politics is one of the general tools for resolving con-
flicts in society. The state as the material embodiment of politics is one of the most effec-
tive institutions for maintaining social peace and the power of law.
The specific character of the political way of resolving conflicts is that any decision 
will be effective if it meets the opinion of the majority of citizens. However, this requires 
the unique personal qualities, the special expertise and even a great deal of craft, since 
contemporary society is extremely fragmented.
In his book “Political Representation,” F. Ankersmit dedicated one of the final chap-
ters to discussing the ways of acquiring the unity of society by means of political com-
promise (“Compromise and Political Creativity” [6, p. 193–214]. As Ankersmit puts it, 
there are two ways to achieve the unity of society in contemporary politics, i.e. consen-
sus and compromise. Compromise requires the recognition of opponents. We should 
recognize our opponents despite the fact that they are committed to opposing political 
principles that could be unacceptable to us. Secondly, a compromise is possible only if 
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there is a mutual desire to fulfill the obligations under the agreement, no matter how 
unpleasant it may be. Thus, the compromise promotes such virtues as tolerance, mu-
tual respect and respect of the moral autonomy, trust, which guarantee the successful 
activity in pluralistic society. On the contrary, we cannot achieve that goal by means of 
consensus.
Contemporary politics is representative politics. This means that politics represents 
almost all political forces as the interests of almost all strata of society. The parliamen-
tary system of government in continental European countries is characterized by political 
competition and the absence of a solid monopoly of power (that is the absence of a single 
representative). This diversity is projected on the structure of legislative body, and con-
sequently on the structure of the executive power. This political system is a result of the 
long evolution. Currently, politicians have no opportunity to engage in politics simply as a 
kind of art of government at present, because of the class, religious, ideological, national, 
linguistic, regional, and gender conflicts. Therefore, compromise became a method of pre-
venting social conflicts, especially in the most acute stages.
Usually, conflicts have a complex structure, since there are a lot parties involved. In 
the conditions like these there are no ready answers. According to Ankersmit, those citi-
zens deserve moral respect, who are ready to recognize the alternative position and put 
their point of view to the test, that is give way to a compromise.
No matter how pragmatic, the compromise is the reason why politicians are accused 
of lying. First, when politicians make mutual concessions they are usually blamed for be-
trayal the values they promised for their electorate to uphold. Secondly, politicians accept 
a compromise on behalf of their voters, but without their personal consent. Thus, politi-
cians are accused of appropriating the right to interpret arbitrary the values of voters for 
the sake of self-interest.
Could we find an ethical meaning of this kind of mutual concessions in politics? The 
first argument is that society will disintegrate if it has not a minimum unity in values value. 
The second reason to place compromise in an ethical layer of political activity is that poli-
ticians, unlike professionals in other areas of social life, can not refuse to make a choice at 
all. Politicians are obliged to bring the bargain to the end and make a deal, no matter how 
bad it may be. At the same time it is not a personal choice that politician makes and she or 
he is responsible for the interests of voters. If political person escapes this kind of choice, 
it would be a political suicide that would result in voters’ disappointment. Moreover, the 
substantial part of the live of the politician would lose its meaning.
To sum up, a political compromise is ethically justified way of action, although this 
proposition contradicts the common moral point of view. Compromise is connected with 
social conflict and the necessity for ethical choice.
The ethical conflict as it is described above could be presented as a choice between 
the bigger or lesser evil. But we have seen that it has a lot of complex characteristics so 
we cannot interpret it simply as a form of that kind of choice. For this reason, we need to 
distinguish the second type of ethical conflict in politics.
It is the situation then the politician has to choose one group’s of citizens life or health 
and welfare over another’s. Fortunately, this type of choice is rare enough and could be 
perceived as a real burden for a political person. In any circumstance, the necessity of this 
choice is a part of political activity any politician could be faced with. The cases of similar 
choices could occur during warfare and in medical ethics.
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It’s worth noting that the second type of ethical conflict in politics is determined with 
the general welfare of the state and its citizens regardless of their political attitudes and 
usually is not the representation of current political actors and political struggle.
Let us take as an example the decision that is attributed to Winston Churchill who, 
being the UK Prime Minister, had the final word in a case of V-1 flying bomb attacks of 
London. During the 1944 Nazi forces used this new type of weapon against the civilians 
resulted in thousand of deaths. At the same time, due to the incompleteness of the V-1 tar-
geting system they didn’t reach the city center and it was the southern part of London that 
turned to be the target of the bombing. The Nazi intelligence services were in want of the 
exact data so UK secret service used the double agents to provide the false information 
about the results of the air attacks. As estimated, that mission saved the heavily populated 
central areas of London. During the Second World War, “Churchill… faced excruciating 
moral dilemmas on an almost daily basis” [7, p. 3–7].
From a theoretical point of view, this form of choice corresponds with the famous 
thought experiment referred as the trolley problem. The trolley problem remains the cen-
tral point in the discussions about moral dilemmas for now.
The classic version of the trolley case was provided by J. J. Thomson on basis of paper 
by Phillipa Foot [8]. The unpiloted and uncontrollable trolley (or a train, a car etc.) goes by 
a track and will inevitably hit and kill five people. If somebody turns a switch and diverts 
the trolley to a side track it will kill another person but only one. In both cases those peo-
ple cannot escape the trolley. At the same time, those people are not responsible for being 
on the rails. Imagine you are able to turn the switch, diverting the trolley to the side and it 
is the only possible way to save five people.
The cases like this have two important attributes. It entails an active choice to inflict 
harm to some person or group of people. Any kind of inaction would be a choice as well, 
but the worst kind of choice as we stated above.
At the same time, the person who makes a choice doesn’t inflict an immediate harm 
to her or himself. However, she or he does not act in some own interests.
These two conditions of this crucial choice are typical for the status of political per-
son.
Here we touch on the issue of the existential components of the political activity that is 
the occasional necessity to face the deep ethical conflicts of this kind. The essential point to 
remember is that, in most cases, a politician couldn’t be held accountable for being in this 
type of the choice situation. In the majority of cases, those situations are the unhappy com-
bination of circumstances or they originate from unjust social institutes and political order.
In real political life this kind of choice could not be realized as a perfect autonomous 
decision. We should also consider the major conditions as a general welfare, the political 
perspective of a choice as well as various situational factors.
On the other hand, the phenomenological aspect of this type of ethical conflict is also 
important. Here we can go deeper in the individual psychological properties of the choice 
because it gives us the opportunity to unravel some specific characteristics of political 
ethics.
This type of political choice could be regarded as a moral dilemma because each al-
ternative is morally approved in some respect at the same time. It is a disaster to leave a 
thousand people for dead but it is the salvation of thousand of thousands that could justify 
that sacrifice.
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For the political ethics however the morally approved alternatives as well as a pos-
sibility of moral justification are not really the point. The crucial component is the uncer-
tainty that quite often comes with a certain degree of risk. Needless to say that this choice 
supposes a responsibility as well that could be placed on politician post factum. Following 
the final paragraphs of “Politics as a Vocation” by Max Weber, M. Walzer states that the 
politician has to take the burden of choice no matter how hard and painful it would be and 
should “be honored for making the right decision when it was a hard decision to make” [3, 
p. 168]. For Walzer, it is essential for a politician to be under deep moral stress while being 
engaged to that type of ethical conflict.
The classical philosophical analysis of moral dilemmas gives us understanding of 
the specific character of such form of ethical conflict and even the exceptional nature 
of political ethics. E J. Lemmon, who provided the first systematical discussion of moral 
dilemmas in contemporary ethics, considered it possible to single out the extreme kind of 
dilemma when person has no distinctive moral theory to comprehend and solve it. This 
ethical conflict challenges our ordinary moral outlook and even makes us to do hard work 
of moral rethinking. E. J. Lemmon suggested the case of negotiations of A. N. Chamber-
lain with Hitler as a real instance of this kind of moral challenge. For Lemmon, Prime 
Minister Chamberlain failed to asses all moral aspects of this conflict in a proper way [9, 
p. 156–157].
An example of the third type of moral conflict in politics is the motivation of the last 
white President of South Africa, Frederik Willem de Klerk, who dismantled the apartheid 
regime in this country.
The consequences of this choice for de Klerk himself are important here. On the one 
hand, there was the objective need for that decision of de Klerk because of the third wave 
of democratization that had changed the attitude towards the apartheid regime in inter-
national politics and increased the international pressure on him. De Klerk acknowledged 
that he was impressed by the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the same time, de Klerk was an 
experienced politician and it is obvious that he realized the consequences of his personal 
choice both for himself and for the white minority in South Africa. In 1993, the transi-
tional government proclaimed that its goal is the national reconciliation and building a 
harmonious society. Unfortunately that goal was not achieved. Three years after that, de 
Klerk resigned from the office of Second Vice-President, that was a symbolic position 
designed to give the appearance of a compromise reached. One more year later, he com-
pletely quit political life.
But the consequences for the Afrikaners in South Africa were much more dramatic. 
Many people were forced to leave the country. Those who remained experienced violence 
and all those events were associated with the decision de Klerk had made. So, for the white 
citizens of the country he became a traitor.
In this case, it is important to focus on the fact that de Klerk was obviously aware of 
the consequences that his policies would lead to.
There was almost no country on the African continent that maintained the interracial 
peace and harmony after gaining independence as a result of decolonization, even if the 
principles of reconciliation and peaceful transit had been previously declared. Sooner or 
later, the white minorities began to undergo economic and social discrimination. In his 
autobiography, de Klerk provides the examples of how the leaders of the African National 
Congress, that was the main opposition force, refused to discuss the special policies for 
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facilitating the shifting away from racial segregation. Moreover, since the beginning of the 
60s the ANC had its own military organization.
In that situation, de Klerk had two options behind him. The first was to keep the 
status quo and establish an authoritarian and repressive dictatorship in South Africa that 
would result in economic, political and cultural degradation of the country. The second 
option was to offer the ANC a compromise that entailed the inevitable risk of eliminating 
Afrikaners from political life and even from the legal and social sphere in the future.
As a moral person, de Klerk could have a kind of choice and speculate what would 
be the better moral solution (i.e. to avoid the choice and retire from politics). But it was 
impossible for de Klerk as a political person to engage himself in the moral decision mak-
ing process. Politician “may operate in a very docile and citizenly environment. He may 
be lucky. He may even have, as a few seem to have, a virtue or moral cunning which drives 
such situations away. But it is a predictable and probable hazard of public life that there 
will be these situations in which something morally disagreeable is clearly required. To 
refuse on moral grounds ever to do anything of that sort is more than likely to mean that 
one cannot seriously pursue even the moral ends of politics” [4, p. 60].
But in terms of the possible consequences, de Klerk’s decision seemed rather ques-
tionable. He saw the example of the dramatic results of the modernization in the USSR 
that affected Mikhail Gorbachev who was the initiator of those changes. At the same time, 
de Klerk also took into account the ineffective attempts of the Serbs as a politically domi-
nant ethnic group in Yugoslavia to keep their position using force in order to prevent 
other nations from managing their own future independently. It seemed obvious, that the 
policy of a compromise between the ruling elite and the opposition, which led to the dis-
mantling of socialism in Eastern Europe, was the most preferable option. From the point 
of view of real politics, it was a case of the strictly rational choice de Klerk was in.
However, de Klerk could also have a religious motive.
The South Africa Afrikaners are known to be very pious people. De Klerk also be-
longed to the Dutch Reformed Church that has the canons dated back to the 16th cen-
tury Calvinism. De Klerk should have perceived the task before him not as a responsible 
personal decision but as a divine command as well. In any case, he could not evade this 
mission, since as a person being chosen to accomplish the will of God he has no space for 
a moral choice or personal doubts.
The argument for this interpretation of de Klerk’s motives to be valid could be found 
in the text of his President’s Oath in 1990: “For me, it was far more than just a formality. 
I experienced it as though I was indeed standing before God and quietly promised that 
I would try to carry out the responsibility that He had entrusted to me with the biblical 
principles of justice, peace and charity as my guidelines”. As we can see, the moral argu-
ments were less important to de Klerk: “My inaugural speech was well received — not 
only by those present, but also by the media. Now I was state president in my own right: 
no longer acting as a result of a crisis in the National Party, but duly elected in terms of 
the constitution of that time. I was deeply aware of the responsibility that went with the 
position. I had no illusions about the enormity of the task that awaited me and my team, 
but I was full of the confidence that accompanies the conviction that one is on the right 
road” [10, p. 151].
From the utilitarianist point of view or the pragmatic approach, de Klerk’s decision 
was equivalent to deliberate political suicide. However, in the perspective of the religious 
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version of political ethics he adhered to, he achieved a victory, although he understood 
clearly that he would become a traitor in the eyes of the white Afrikaners. Here is how 
he motivated his decision to withdraw from political activity: “I had to consider my re-
sponsibility to my church, party and society. There were tremendous — and mostly well 
intended — pressures on me to turn back. Friends in my church appealed to me to take a 
moral stand akin to the political stand that I had taken on 2 February 1990. Powerful reli-
gious, political, moral and personal arguments were advanced — all of them related to my 
religion, place in history and the fact that I had become an important role model in more 
than just politic” [10, p. 367]. Here, we have an example of firm conviction that faith and 
historical mission requires certain personal decision that will be recognized by the pious 
compatriots sooner or later. Thereafter, de Klerk made no attempt to excuse himself in his 
public speeches or in his autobiography.
The politicians are inclined to impose a certain mission on themselves or at the very 
least to perceive themselves as leaders, whose contribution to politics would be highly 
appreciated in the future. However, we have few examples of the fact that any successful 
political person (let us emphasize this point) would voluntarily retire to private life after 
achieving those great goals. And this was exactly what Frederik de Klerk did.
In our interpretation, the example of the political choice of de Klerk shows that po-
litical ethics may include the effects of individual morality. For political person, the belief 
in the moral correctness of her or his decision, even if that decision is not perceived as 
morally justified by the majority of citizens, is a necessary component of both the politi-
cal activity itself and the solution of ethical conflicts in the political sphere. This belief in 
the moral correctness is one of the strong arguments in favor of political advisability of a 
political decision.
It is important that, unlike the professional choice in other significant expert com-
munities, decision of politician involves the most serious consequences for the whole state 
and society, which is a specific feature of this type of decision. Therefore, we could allow 
the use of individual morality by the politicians only if they perceive their “mission” in the 
distinct limits of human and personal abilities.
Conclusion
In spite of being a type of applied ethics, political ethics cannot be expressed in the 
form of professional codes, clear instructions or even general recommendations. We could 
make the classification of the cases that are close in content and the optimal way for being 
resolve, but this typology would not allow us to construct the general model or develop the 
set of ethical norms and rules in political ethics. Every case needs to be considered ad hoc.
The cases when politicians violate their promises do not prove that they are immoral 
people since it constitutes a part of their professional skills and expert competence. How-
ever, this proposition can not be used as the justification of conscious lying, deception, 
betrayal etc.
The common moral norms couldn’t be used in applied ethics including the political 
ethics. Following the norms of common moral consciousness in the case of a complex 
ethical conflict in politics would sometimes produce more harm to society than the prag-
matic choice of lesser evil. Every subjective moral preference should give way to objective 
goals and tasks that comply with general welfare of the state and its citizens.
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What is more, the general normative consent (or consensus) about moral values or 
fundamental principles and moral justification of moral choice could inflict harm in po-
litical ethics. The specifics of the political sphere of society and the existing relations be-
tween the main actors in it prove that it is compromise that would be efficient, desirable 
and ethically justified way of conflict solving. Compromise is a form of consent when 
parties respect each other’s interests and are willing to give up some part of their demands 
in exchange for a similar refusal from the side of other party.
The case of political choice is characterized with the lack of complete and reliable 
information, as well as with the difficulty to predict accurately the reaction of those who 
would be affected by this choice and the intervention of unforeseen circumstances. Since 
it is impossible to foresee all the consequences of a political decision, when evaluating a 
political choice we need to take into account the conditions under which this choice of a 
political person was made and a main motive of that person. As for the motive of a politi-
cal person, it could be considered as ethically justified when this person imposes on her 
or his self consciously and voluntary some form of responsibility for the choice in a hard 
situation of ethical conflict.
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В статье предпринята попытка определить и  описать специфику морального выбо-
ра в политической этике. Для этой цели выявлены характерные черты политической 
этики как прикладной этики, ее отличие от других направлений прикладной этики. 
Далее показано, каким образом и с какими ограничениями политическая этика может 
рассматриваться как профессиональная этика. Определяется, что дилеммы, встающие 
перед политиками, не могут разрешаться в нормах и принципах общественной морали. 
Обосновывается положение о том, что неустранимые свойства и цели политической 
деятельности, ее существенное воздействие на благосостояние и жизнь граждан госу-
дарства, высокая степень риска и неопределенности, а также наличие открытых этиче-
ских проблем не позволяют прибегать в политике напрямую к обыденной нравствен-
ности или универсальным этическим теориям. В силу этого выдвигается положение 
о том, что в ситуации морального выбора политическая этика ориентирует скорее на 
разрешение каждой ситуации отдельно, поскольку попытка создания универсальных 
предписаний и рекомендаций неизбежно окажется бесплодной. В статье предлагает-
ся типология конфликтных ситуаций, специфических для политической этики. Пер-
вый тип  — моральный конфликт, вызванный необходимостью политического ком-
промисса, который требует нарушения политиком данных ранее обещаний. Второй 
тип  — собственно моральные дилеммы, предполагающие выбор жизни или смерти 
других людей. Третий тип представляет собой выбор между политической карьерой 
самого политика и реализацией исторически значимых целей и задач. Характеристика 
каждого из данных типов этического конфликта сопровождается анализом примеров 
из политической практики. Основные исследовательские методы статьи: этико-кате-
гориальный анализ, сравнительный анализ, культурно-исторический метод, анализ 
моральных дилемм, ивент-анализ, политико-психологический метод, метод политико-
культурной компаративистики, контент-анализ.
Ключевые слова: политическая этика, моральный конфликт, моральный выбор в  по-
литике, компромисс, ложь в политике, моральная мотивация политиков, ответствен-
ность политиков, политическое самоубийство.
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